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Abstract—This letter studies information-theoretic security
without knowing the eavesdropper’s channel fading state. We
present an alternative secrecy outage formulation to measure the
probability that message transmissions fail to achieve perfect se-
crecy. Using this formulation, we design two transmission schemes
that satisfy the given security requirement while achieving good
throughput performance.
Index Terms—Information-theoretic security, secrecy outage
probability, channel state information.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of achieving information-theoretic security
over wireless channels without knowing the eavesdropper’s
instantaneous channel state information (CSI) has attracted
considerable attention recently. The performance limits of
such systems have been characterized in terms of the ergodic
secrecy capacity (see, e.g., [1, 2]), which captures the capacity
limits under the constraint of perfect secrecy. This measure
applies for delay-tolerant systems, assuming that the encoded
messages span sufficient channel realizations to capture the
ergodic features of the channel. For systems with stringent
delay constraints, however, perfect secrecy cannot always be
achieved, and outage-based characterizations become more
appropriate by providing a probabilistic performance measure
of secure communication.
The idea of secrecy outages has been adopted in [3, 4],
where an outage formulation was presented to capture the
probability of having a transmission that is both reliable and
secure [3–6]. As we will discuss, however, that formulation
does not give a direct indication of the security level in
the system, since it accounts for outage events which do
not necessarily reflect failures in achieving perfect secrecy.
In this letter, we put forth an alternative formulation which
gives a more direct measure of system security, accounting
for design parameters such as the rate of the transmitted
codewords as well as the condition under which transmission is
suspended. This new formulation provides a useful framework
for computing the probability that transmitted messages are
perfectly secure against eavesdropping. Based on our formu-
lation, we also design two transmission schemes, each of
which guarantees a certain level of security whilst maximizing
the throughput. The first scheme requires CSI feedback from
the legitimate receiver to the transmitter, whereas the second
scheme requires only 1 bit of feedback.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the transmission of confidential messages from
Alice to Bob over a Rayleigh fading channel in the presence of
an eavesdropper, Eve. The transmit power, P , is assumed fixed
to the maximum level. The channel gains from Alice to Bob
and Eve are denoted as hb and he, both assumed to undergo
independent quasi-static fading. The receiver noise variances
at Bob and Eve are denoted by σ2b and σ2e .
The instantaneous signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at Bob and
Eve are given by γb = P|hb|2/σ2b and γe = P|he|2/σ2e ,
respectively, each having an exponential distribution given by
fi(γi) =
1
γ¯i
exp
(
−
γi
γ¯i
)
, γi > 0, i = b, e, (1)
where γ¯b and γ¯e are the average SNRs at Bob and Eve, respec-
tively. We assume that Bob and Eve know their individual CSI
perfectly and the statistics of both channels are known at Alice.
We will consider different assumptions on the availability of
Bob’s instantaneous CSI at Alice, as discussed later. However,
Eve’s instantaneous CSI is unknown at Alice, and therefore
perfect secrecy cannot always be achieved.
A. Existing Secrecy Outage Formulation
In the existing secrecy outage formulation [3, 4], the outage
event is defined as O(Rs) := {Cs < Rs}, where Rs > 0 is
the target secrecy rate, and1
Cs = [Cb − Ce]
+ = [log2(1 + γb)− log2(1 + γe)]
+ (2)
is the secrecy capacity, expressed in terms of Bob’s channel
capacity Cb and Eve’s channel capacity Ce. The secrecy
outage probability is defined as
pout = P(Cs < Rs). (3)
Here, an outage occurs whenever a message transmission is
either unreliable (i.e., it cannot be decoded by Bob) or it
is not perfectly secure (i.e., there is some information leak-
age to Eve). Whilst this secrecy outage formulation gives
a fundamental characterization of the possibility of having
a reliable and secure transmission, it does not distinguish
between reliability and security. Hence, an outage does not
necessarily imply a failure in achieving perfect secrecy. Fur-
thermore, if Alice knows that Bob’s channel cannot support the
secrecy rate, i.e.,Cb < Rs, then she would certainly suspend
transmission. This “suspension event” falls within the outage
event O(Rs), since Cb < Rs implies Cs < Rs; however, it is
clearly not a failure in achieving perfect secrecy. From a design
perspective, it is important to provide an outage formulation
which gives a more explicit measure of the level of security,
in order to design transmission schemes which meet target
security requirements.
1Here we employ the common notation, [z]+ = max{0, z}.
2III. ALTERNATIVE SECRECY OUTAGE FORMULATION
We now present an alternative secrecy outage formulation
which directly measures the probability that a transmitted
message fails to achieve perfect secrecy. Consider the well-
known Wyner’s encoding scheme [7]: The encoder chooses
two rates, namely, the rate of the transmitted codewords Rb,
and the rate of the confidential information Rs. The rate
difference Re , Rb − Rs reflects the cost of securing the
message transmission against eavesdropping. For any trans-
mitted message, Bob is able to decode correctly if Cb > Rb,
whilst perfect secrecy fails if Ce > Re. Hence, we define the
secrecy outage probability as the conditional probability
pso , P(Ce > Rb −Rs |message transmission), (4)
conditioned upon a message actually being transmitted. Unlike
the existing secrecy outage formulation, our new formulation
takes into account the system design parameters, such as the
rate of the transmitted codewords as well as the condition
under which message transmissions take place, and therefore
provides a more explicit measure of the level of security.
When transmission always occurs, which is usually the case
if Alice has absolutely no knowledge about the instantaneous
CSI of Bob’s channel, the secrecy outage probability reduces
to the unconditional probability P(Ce > Rb − Rs), which
was considered in [8]. More generally, when some form of
instantaneous CSI of Bob’s channel is available, Alice can
decide whether or not to transmit with possibly variable
rates according to the channel condition. This is important
since, as we will see, by carefully designing the condition for
transmission, it is possible to dramatically reduce the secrecy
outage probability. With this new formulation, the system
designer can use the secrecy outage probability to characterize
the security level and design transmission schemes that meet
target security requirements.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
In this section, we consider the design problem of max-
imizing the throughput η = ptxRs, where ptx denotes the
probability of transmission. Note that ptx can be interpreted
as a quality of service (QoS) measure.2 The primary design
requirement is on the security level. In addition, one can
impose another constraint on the probability of transmission
as a QoS requirement. The design problem can be written as
max η, s.t. pso ≤ ǫ, ptx ≥ σ, (5)
where ǫ ∈ [0, 1] and σ ∈ [0, 1] represent the minimum security
and QoS requirements. The controllable design parameters
are the rate of the transmitted codewords, Rb, the rate of
the confidential information, Rs, as well as the condition for
transmission. In the following, we consider the design of two
different transmission schemes, based on Alice having either
full or limited knowledge of the instantaneous CSI of Bob’s
channel. The condition for transmission is given by an on-off
scheme; i.e., transmission takes place whenever the value of γb
exceeds some SNR threshold µ. Note that µ ≥ 2Rs−1 always
holds, since transmission can only happen when Cb ≥ Rs.
2For strictly delay-limited systems, 1− ptx represents the probability of a
message packet being dropped. For systems allowing moderate delays, p−1tx −1
may give an indication of the average delay of transmission.
A. Adaptive Encoder with On-Off Transmission
First, we consider the scenario where the encoder is able to
adaptively choose the rate of the transmitted codewords, Rb,
according to the instantaneous CSI of Bob’s channel. In fact,
only the instantaneous SNR, γb, needs to be fed back from Bob
to Alice. The encoder sets Rb arbitrarily close to Cb, i.e., the
largest possible rate without incurring any decoding error at
Bob. For any given values of Rs and µ, we can compute the
transmission probability as
ptx = P(γb > µ) = exp(−µ/γ¯b). (6)
Also, the secrecy outage probability is given by
pso = P(Ce > Cb −Rs | γb > µ)
= P
(
γb < 2
Rs(1 + γe)− 1 | γb > µ
)
=
P
(
µ < γb < 2
Rs(1 + γe)− 1
)
P(γb > µ)
= exp
(
µ
γ¯b
)∫
∞
µ+1
2Rs
−1
(∫ 2Rs (1+γe)−1
µ
fb(γb)dγb
)
fe(γe)dγe
=
γ¯e2
Rs
γ¯e2Rs + γ¯b
exp
(
−
µ+ 1− 2Rs
γ¯e2Rs
)
. (7)
We see that the SNR threshold for on-off transmission, µ,
presents a trade-off between the QoS and security. More
specifically, a higher security level can be achieved by com-
promising the QoS, which is done by choosing a larger µ.
Now, we consider the design problem of finding the values
of Rs and µ that maximize the throughput3, given by
argmax
Rs,µ
ptx(µ)Rs,
s.t. pso(µ,Rs) ≤ ǫ, ptx(µ) ≥ σ, µ ≥ 2Rs − 1, Rs > 0,
where we have explicitly shown the dependence of ptx and
pso on µ and Rs. To solve this problem, we first establish
an expression for the optimal µ for any given Rs as follows:
Using (6), the feasible range of µ that satisfies ptx(µ) ≥ σ is
found as µ ∈ [2Rs−1, γ¯b lnσ−1]. The throughput maximizing
µ takes its smallest possible value while satisfying the security
constraint. Since pso(µ,Rs) in (7) is a decreasing function of
µ, we obtain the optimal µ as
µ=
{
2Rs−1, if Rs≤ log2
γ¯bǫ
γ¯e(1−ǫ)
,
2Rs(1−γ¯e ln ǫ+γ¯e ln
γ¯e2
Rs
γ¯e2Rs+γ¯b
)−1, otherwise,
where the first case presents the scenario that setting µ to its
smallest value still satisfies the security constraint of pso ≤ ǫ;
otherwise, we have the second case by solving pso = ǫ.
The condition for having secure communication with some
positive rate while satisfying both constraints can be found as
ǫ >
γ¯e
γ¯e + γ¯b
σγ¯b/γ¯e .
Under this condition, we can formulate the optimization prob-
lem as
argmax
Rs
Rs exp(−µ/γ¯b),
s.t. Rs > 0, µ ≤ γ¯b lnσ−1,
where µ is a function of Rs, whose expression was found
above. Although the dependence of µ on Rs makes it difficult
3Ideally, one can adaptively change Rs according to the instantaneous SNR.
However, the optimal solution for this adaptive design is very difficult to
obtain. Here, we look for the optimal Rs that is constant over time.
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Fig. 1. Comparison between existing and new secrecy outage formulations.
to obtain a closed-form solution, this problem can be easily
solved numerically.
B. Non-Adaptive Encoder with On-Off Transmission
Now we consider the transmission design with a non-
adaptive encoder in which the rate of the codewords, Rb, is
constant over time (but needs to be optimally chosen). In
contrast to the adaptive encoder design which requires the
feedback of the instantaneous SNR, this design only requires 1
bit of feedback to enable the on-off transmission scheme. For
any given values of Rb, Rs, and µ, the transmission probability
is given by (6) and the secrecy outage probability is given by
pso = P(Ce > Rb −Rs | γb > µ) = P(Ce > Rb −Rs)
= exp
(
−
2Rb−Rs − 1
γ¯e
)
. (8)
Again, we consider the design problem of finding the values
of Rb, Rs and µ that maximize the throughput, given by
arg max
Rb,Rs,µ
ptx(µ)Rs,
s.t. pso(Rb, Rs)≤ǫ, ptx(µ)≥σ, µ≥2Rb−1, Rs>0.
We first establish expressions for the optimal µ and Rs
for any given Rb as follows: Since pso(Rb, Rs) in (8) is
independent of µ, it is optimal to minimize µ in order to
maximize ptx(µ) in (6). Hence, we obtain the optimal µ as
µ = 2Rb − 1.
Note that Rb ≤ log2(1 + γ¯b lnσ−1) is required or ptx(µ) ≥ σ
can never be satisfied. For any given Rb, the throughput max-
imizing Rs takes its maximum possible value while satisfying
pso(Rb, Rs) ≤ ǫ. Hence, we obtain the optimal Rs as
Rs = Rb − κ, where κ = log2(1 + γ¯e ln ǫ−1).
The condition for having secure communication with some
positive rate while satisfying both constraints can be found as
ǫ > σγ¯b/γ¯e .
Under this condition, we can formulate the optimization prob-
lem as
argmax
Rb
(Rb − κ) exp
(
−
2Rb − 1
γ¯b
)
,
s.t. κ < Rb ≤ log2(1 + γ¯b lnσ
−1),
which in this case admits the explicit solution
Rb=min
{
κ+
1
ln 2
W0
(¯
γb exp(−κ ln 2)
)
, log2(1+γ¯b lnσ
−1)
}
,
where W0(·) is the principal branch of Lambert’s W function.
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V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Fig. 1 presents the secrecy outage probability, comparing
the existing formulation (3) and the new formulation (7). In
both cases, the rate of transmitted codewords is adaptively
chosen as Rb = Cb. For the new formulation, the on-off SNR
threshold is set to its minimum value of µ = 2Rs − 1, which
gives the maximum outage probability. We see from the figure
that the outage probabilities predicted by the two formulations
differ significantly. Hence, the existing formulation cannot be
directly used to measure the security level.
Fig. 2 compares the achievable throughput of our proposed
adaptive and non-adaptive encoder designs, for a range of se-
curity constraints. The QoS constraint is fixed to σ = 0.5. We
see that it is generally impossible to achieve arbitrarily low se-
crecy outage probability, which agrees with the lower bounds
on the secrecy outage probability derived in Section IV. This
figure also shows that a significant throughput improvement
is obtained by adaptively changing the rate of the transmitted
codewords based on knowledge of Bob’s instantaneous CSI.
On the other hand, the design with non-adaptive encoder only
requires 1 bit of feedback, which minimizes the feedback
overhead.
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